



ast summer, the thinktank
Policy Exchange caused
controversy with a report 
on urban regeneration. 
In essence, the report
suggested that some places in Britain
(mostly in the North) have lost their raison
d'etre, that regeneration efforts aren’t
making a difference and that we should
build houses (in the South) so that people
can move to places with better
opportunities.
Conservative leader David Cameron,
who was touring marginal Northern
constituencies at the time, dismissed the
report as insane. Government ministers
agreed. The authors faced a barrage of
criticism from offended individuals and
local authorities.
The basic counter-argument goes like
this: ‘I am from [insert name of place]. It's
a lovely place to live because [insert
something nice about the place or
mention the low cost of living]. If you
want to see where [insert name of place]
is heading, just look at the development
of [insert name of nice new buildings].’
These reactions remind us that people
and places are different and that amenities
and cost of living matter as much as
economic opportunities. But they miss a
much more serious question: why do some
regions, cities and communities
prosper while others don’t, and
what, if anything, should government
policy try to do about it?
There is no doubt that economic
activity in Britain is very unevenly
distributed. In 2004, the contribution to
the economy of each individual (gross
value added or GVA per person) in inner
London and in Berkshire, Buckinghamshire
and Oxfordshire was £24,500 and
£23,700 respectively (adjusted for
commuting) – about 40% above the
national average of £17,100.
In the same year, Cornwall and the
Isles of Scilly, West Wales and the Valleys
and the Tees Valley and Durham had GVA
per head of £11-13,000 – 24% or more
below the national average. The
differences would be even more striking if
we considered particular cities or
neighbourhoods within cities.
It is inconceivable that this unevenness
can be explained purely by inherent
differences in physical geography, such as
natural resources. Instead, over time, the
economic system amplifies initial
differences to generate persistent
disparities. This happens because there are
self-reinforcing benefits from the
concentration of activity.
These benefits arise in many different
ways. As long ago as 1890, Alfred
Marshall suggested that spatial proximity
benefits firms and people because it helps
the transfer of knowledge, allows people
and firms to specialise and makes it easier
to trade goods that are costly to transport.
Economic geographers continue to try to
quantify these benefits.
A range of costs offsets the benefits:
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as activity concentrates, the prices of
scarce resources such as land increase,
firms face more competition, roads get
congested, and pollution worsens. The
trade-off between these costs and benefits
determines which areas are rich and which
are poor, which grow fast and which grow
slowly.
Factors like technological change and
globalisation also affect the trade-off, with
fundamental implications for Britain’s
spatial economy. Responses to these
changes are not instantaneous, instead
playing out over time as people and
organisations slowly adjust. And, of
course, government policies shape all
these relationships.
Understanding spatial disparities, and
identifying the appropriate policy
responses, requires a much deeper
understanding of the costs and benefits.
What causes them? Are they changing?
What are the implications? What policy
interventions are effective? Are there
trade-offs between spatial disparities and
economic efficiency? 
As the British government spends
billions of pounds each year on policies for
regional development and urban
regeneration, answering these questions is
of more than academic interest.
Unfortunately, however, getting the right
answers is difficult. There are many
sources of costs and benefits and their
importance differs across individuals, 
firms and locations, raising the possibility
of ‘sorting’: different kinds of individuals
and firms choosing to locate in different
places.
Sorting is a key factor that makes
spatial policy so difficult to get right. 
With sorting, many spatial disparities
simply reflect inequalities in society that
may not be directly or effectively reduced
by spatial policy.
Differences between the North and
South, between Manchester and Leeds,
between Hackney and Westminster
partly reflect decisions by different
people and businesses about 
where is best for them to live, work
or produce. The greater the
difference between the fortunes
of financial services and
traditional manufacturing or
between low- and high-skilled
workers, the greater will be
the likely spatial differences
that result.
Personal inequality in Britain is high
relative to many other European countries,
as is the contrast between the
performance of some of our
manufacturing and financial services. So it
is no surprise that spatial inequalities –
such as ‘postcode lotteries’ in health or
‘North-South divides’ – partly reflect that.
Spatial policy may play a role in
addressing these equity concerns. But
other policies that directly affect the
underlying personal inequalities are likely
to be far more effective.
At the same time, because some
economic outcomes depend on location,
even for similar people or firms, there is
also a role for policy in making the
economy function more efficiently. The
difficulty is determining when this is
happening and what policy might do,
particularly since sorting based on
personal differences means that the
existence of spatial inequalities per se
tells us nothing about whether or not
such effects are important.
We are a long way from a full
understanding of all these issues
and thus from knowing exactly
what policy should do. Personally, I
don’t think that the existing
evidence supports the conclusion
that we ‘should all move south’
(the rather crude interpretation of
Policy Exchange’s message, which led to
so much venom). But, for all the reasons
outlined above, the existing evidence
doesn’t support the idea that we could, or
should, eliminate all spatial disparities (an
equally crude interpretation of
government policy). 
The answer, as usual, is somewhere
between the two extremes. Of course, the
crucial issue is where the balance lies. CEP
research has already played a central role
in advancing our thinking on this issue.
Funding from government and the ESRC
for the new Spatial Economics Research
Centre based at LSE should help this to
continue.
In the current economic climate,
careful research to get the right answers
to these questions and to help formulate
the appropriate policy response matters
much more than whether I think my town
is better than yours.
Henry Overman is reader in economic
geography at LSE, director of the new ESRC
Spatial Economics Research Centre
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best for them to
live, work or
produce